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INSURANCE--NOTIFICATION CLAUSES OF CONTAcTs-Plaintiff's
seventeen-months-old child was killed through the alleged negli-
gence of one Carl E. Toler, the child's great-uncle, who resided
with the plaintiffs. The insurance contract carried by Toler re-
quired him to ntoify the insurer of any accident "as soon as prac-
ticable." After the death of the child, plaintiffs on two different
occasions told Toler that they did not desire to bring suit for
damages for the death of their child. Finally, they decided to
sue and told Toler of their intention. Toler then notified the
defendant, his insurance carrier, of the accident eight-two days
after it had occurred. The trial court held that plaintiffs were
barred because of this delay. The Court of Appeal of Louisiana,
First Circuit, affirmed this decision. Jackson v. State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Company, 23 So. (2d) 765 (La. App.
1945).
The decision of this case was based upon an interpretation
by the court of Act 243 of 1918 as amended by Act 55 of 1930.1
In cases that involve a delay in giving notice, the Louisiana
courts have been inconsistent with respect to the rights of the
third party. In the case of Jones v. Shehee-Ford Wagon and
Harness Company, Incorporated2 the insured gave the insurer
notice of the accident twenty-six days after its occurrence. The
supreme court held that this was a substantial compliance with
the terms of the contract which required notice "as soon as prac-
ticable." However, it did not consider whether the injured party
was subject to the notification provisions of the contract.3 Pre-
viously the court had declared in Edwards v. Rojal Indemnity
Company4 that "public liability not only protects the insured
from loss caused by his negligence, but is also in favor of the
party who sustains damages through the insured's fault."5  And
in Davies v. Consolidated Underwriters,' the court had said that
"the enforcement of a policy provision requiring notice to be
given by the insured automatically and without any action on
his [the third party's] part deprives him of the right of action
granted by law. It is not desirable that he should be divested
1. See Fordham and Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort
in Louisiana (1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW RE:vlzw 720, 749; McClendon, Public Lia-
bility Insurance-The Injured Person's Right of Recovery When the Policy-
holder Fails To Give Immediate Notice to the Insurer (1935) 10 Tulane L.
Rev. 455; Note (1942) 4 LoUiSIANA LAw REvI.w 455.
2. 183 La. 293, 163 So. 129 (1935).
3. La. Act 55 of 1930 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4248].
4. 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935).
5. 182 La. 171, 181, 161 So. 191, 195.
6. 199 La. 459, 6 So. (2d) 351 (1942).
19461 NOTES
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of such action. . .. -7 These expressions indicate that as, between
the insurer and the injured third party, the provisions of the
policy with respect to the giving of notice will be liberally con-
strued. Where the insured is the plaintiff, literal compliance
with the terms of the policy has generally been required.'
On the other hand, the majority of decisions rendered by the
courts of appeal have required strict compliance with the notifi-
cation provisions of the contract by the injured third party as
well as the insured. In Howard v. Rowan9 the Court of Appeal
for the Second Circuit held that a delay of forty-four days was
not excusable where the policy required "immediate" notice.
Duncan v. Pedare"I presented a lapse of eight months before the
insurer was given notice of the accident. However, twenty-six
days after the third party was aware of his injury he notified the
insured, who in turn informed his insurer two days later. The
Court of Appeal for the First Circuit allowed the injured party
to recover, but upon a rehearing1 the decision was reversed, it
appearing that the insured should have known of the possibility
of injury and the resulting claim. In a 1939 case" the Orleans
Court of Appeal held that a twenty-five day delay by the insured
in giving notice where the policy required such notification to
be "as soon as practicable" did not preclude the injured party
from recovering. The decision was based on this being a sub-
stantial compliance with the terms of the contract.
The policy provision in the principal case requiring the noti-
fication of the accident "as soon as practicable" was held to be
synonymous with "immediately" and "promptly." In deciding
that the insured did not notify the defendants "as soon as prac-
ticable," the court made no distinction between the insured and
a third party claimant with respect to the standard to be applied.
It was held that the injured party was governed by the terms of
the contract.
Policy provisions requiring prompt notification are designed
to afford the insurance company an opportunity to get on the
scene to secure the testimony of witnesses before they become
dispersed or their recollection of the facts becomes vague. They
are also for the purpose of giving the insurer an opportunity to
7. 199 La. 459, 477, 6 So. (2d) 351, 357.
8. Dennis Sheen Transfer v. Georgia Casualty Co., 163 La. 969, 113 So. 165
(1927); Wheeler v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 180 La. 366, 156 So.
420 (1934).
9. 154 So. 382 (La. App. 1934).
10. 161 So. 221 (La. App. 1935).
11. 164 So. 498 (La. App. 1935).
12. Jones v, American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 185 So. 509 (La. App. 1939).
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make a quick settlement before there is any collusion between
the parties. Another design of notification clauses is to provide a
means of preventing unnecessary litigation by allowing the in-
surer to deal directly with the injured party before he feels the
need of consulting counsel. This latter consideration is the only
basis on which the defendants may have claimed prejudice in
the instant case, as all of the witnesses were on hand and there
appeared to be no evidence of collusion.
Liability insurance, besides being a benefit to the insured, is
also for the benefit of society in that the loss is distributed and
not borne by one individual. The State of Massachusetts has rec-
ognized this social problem and has attempted to solve it by re-
quiring compulsory automobile liability insurance.13  On the
basis of the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court only sub-
stantial compliance with provisions requiring notice seems to be
necessary. In determining this issue, an inquiry must be made
as to whether the delay has been prejudicial to the insurer. The
decisions appear to place the burden of proving substantial com-
pliance on the plaintiff. To require the insurer to prove that it
has been prejudiced by the delay in order to escape liability
would probably effectuate the social objective of Act 55 of 1930.
WADE H. DAVIS
PRESCRIPTION OF MOVABLES-MEANING OF "STOLEN" IN ARTICLES
3506 AND 3507, LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870-A Florida automo-
bile dealer permitted a prospective customer to use one of its
automobiles for a short trip within that state. The customer,
however, drove the car to Louisiana and sold it. After the car
had passed through several hands in Louisiana, the dealer sued
the last purchaser, a possessor in good faith by just title, for its
recovery. The supreme court gave judgment for plaintiff on two
grounds: First, the sale from the prospective customer to a Louis-
iana purchaser and all other sales were nullities under Article
2452 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Second, the act of driving the
car out of Florida constituted larceny under Florida law, and
hence a good faith possessor under a just title in Louisiana could
acquire ownership only by such possession for ten years. Articles
3506 and 3509 of the Civil Code were cited to sustain the latter
position. Packard Florida Motors Company v. Malone, 24 So.
(2d) 75 (La. 1945).
13. 5 Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 175, § 112. See Blanchard, Compulsory
Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance in Massachusetts (1936).
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